UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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12 TEDDY LEROY WILSON, Jr., CDCR **#78443**, 13 Plaintiff,

Case No. 06cv2420-WQH (BLM)

14 v.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION FOR ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

ISMAEL BRIZYELA, et al.,

[Doc. No. 25]

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Defendants.

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This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States District Judge William Q. Hayes pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Civil Local Rules 72.1(c) and 72.3(f) of the United States District Court for the Southern District of California.

On November 1, 2006, Plaintiff Teddy Leroy Wilson, Jr., who is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this civil rights suit against several defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Doc. No. 1. The district judge sua sponte screened and dismissed his Complaint and subsequent First Amended Complaint and Plaintiff ultimately filed a Second Amended Complaint [Doc. No. 13]. The district judge sua sponte screened the Second Amended Complaint and dismissed without leave to

amend all but Plaintiff's excessive force claims asserted in Count 2 of his Second Amended Complaint. Doc. No. 14.

On July 18, 2007, Defendants Hector Rubio and Ismael Brizuela, the only defendants remaining in the case, filed a motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds. Doc. No. 25. After requesting and receiving several extensions of time to respond, Plaintiff filed a timely opposition. Doc. No. 44. Defendants filed a reply on January 29, 2008. Doc. No 45.

This Court finds the issue appropriate for decision on the papers pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1.(d)(1). <u>See</u> Doc. No. 42. The Court has considered the Second Amended Complaint ("SAC"), Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff's Opposition, Defendants' Reply and all supporting documents submitted by the parties. For the reasons set forth below, this Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 25] be GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.

BACKGROUND1

Plaintiff claims Defendants Ismael Brizuela and Hector Rubio, both parole officers in the El Cajon parole office, used excessive force against him in violation of the Constitution after he already had been discharged from parole. SAC at 8². Specifically, Plaintiff explains that on March 17, 2006, Officers Brizuela and Rubio stopped his car while he was driving home from his drug treatment program. Id. According to Plaintiff, when he exited the car, an unknown man pointed

The instant facts are those from the SAC pertaining to claims that survived the district judge's final screening on June 12, 2007.

For ease of reference, the Court relies on the page numbering at the top of the SAC, which was affixed by the Court's electronic filing system.

a gun at him and then Officers Brizuela and Rubio "attacked" him, forced his hands behind his back, pushed him to the ground, punched him in the face, sprayed him with something, punched him again, kicked him, then put him in handcuffs and leg chains. <u>Id.</u> at 8-9. They allegedly told him during this struggle that they just wanted to talk to him, but wanted him to be handcuffed first. <u>Id.</u> Plaintiff claims he was never told he was being placed under arrest, but he was taken to the El Cajon parole office and talked to before being released. <u>Id.</u> at 9-10.

In his SAC, Plaintiff seeks an injunction preventing the officers from retaliating against Plaintiff for filing the instant action and \$7,000,000.00 in punitive damages. <u>Id.</u> at 17.

DISCUSSION

Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff's SAC on the ground that they are immune from liability under the Eleventh Amendment because Plaintiff's claims for monetary damages were brought against them solely in their official capacities. Defs.' Mem. at 1-2. In response, Plaintiff points out that he, in fact, sued Defendants in both their official and individual capacities, as reflected on page two of his SAC where he checked the boxes for both individual and official capacities for each officer.³ Pl.'s Opp'n at 1.

It is well established that the Eleventh Amendment bars a prisoner's § 1983 claims for monetary damages against state actors sued in their official capacities. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66, 71 (1989) (emphasizing that the amendment prohibits damages actions against the "official's office," in other

 $^{^{\}scriptscriptstyle 3}$ $\,$ Plaintiff utilized the standardized section 1983 complaint form provided by the Southern District of California.

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words, actions that are in reality suits against the state itself, rather than its individual officials); Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 472 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, to the extent Plaintiff sued Defendants in their official capacities seeking monetary damages as a remedy for his excessive force claims, his claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment and must be dismissed.

However, it is equally well-established that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar damage actions against state officials sued in their personal capacities. <u>Hafer v. Melo</u>, 502 U.S. 21, 30-31 (1991). A personal capacity suit is one in which the plaintiff seeks to impose individual liability upon a government officer for actions taken under color of state law. <u>Id.</u> at 25.

While Defendants argue essentially that it is immaterial that Plaintiff checked the "individual capacity" box because he wrote "in their official capacity" within his description of the his excessive force claims (see Def.'s Reply at 1-2), the Court disagrees. Where a section 1983 plaintiff is proceeding pro per and in forma pauperis, the Court has a duty to construe his complaint liberally in determining the capacity in which the defendants are being sued. Ashker v. California <u>Dept. of Corr.</u>, 112 F.3d 392, 395 (9th Cir. 1997). Moreover, the Ninth Circuit repeatedly has held that "a section 1983 suit against state actors necessarily implies a suit against the defendants in their personal capacities." Cerrato v. San Francisco Cmty. Coll. Dist., 26 F.3d 968, 973 n.16 (9th Cir. 1994). In this case, Plaintiff specified clearly in his SAC that he intended to sue Defendants in their individual capacities, that he was seeking to hold Defendants liable for actions they took "under color of law" and that he was seeking monetary damages. See SAC at 2, 8, 13, 17. Because Plaintiff is proceeding both pro per and in forma pauperis, the Court finds these allegations sufficient to sustain his SAC against Defendants in their individual or personal capacities. See Ashker, 112 F.3d at 395.

Accordingly, this Court **RECOMMENDS** that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss be **GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.**

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the District Court issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation, (2) granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss as to Plaintiff's claims for damages against Defendants in their official capacities, and (3) denying Defendants' Motion to Dismiss as to Plaintiff's claims for damages against Defendants in their individual capacities.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any written objections to this Report must be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than February 14, 2008. The document should be captioned "Objections to Report and Recommendation."

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than February 28, 2008. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court's order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998).

DATED: January 30, 2008

BARBARA L. MAJOR

United States Magistrate Judge

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